Why CEOs Make So Much More Money Than Their Employees

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Essay #: 069895
Total text length is 10,881 characters (approximately 7.5 pages).

Excerpts from the Paper

The beginning:
Why CEOs Make So Much More Money Than Their Employees
Introduction
The question under investigation in this paper is which sort of theorist – a structural functionalist theorist or a Marxist conflict theorist – offers the best explanation for why CEOs make so much more money than their lower-paid employees. The method by which a finding shall be arrived at is a careful review of the scholarly literature with an eye towards discriminating which aspects of each theory appear to hold the greatest relevance with regards to our specific topic. In essence, since this is not a substantive paper in the sense that primary research is being carried out, a literature review should be sufficient.
The theoretical perspective or paradigm that shall be...
The end:
..... corporations pay CEOs so much and others so little. Nonetheless, there is enough evidence of corporations having to engage in merit pay to keep talented people for us to know that practicality trumps a desire to advantage members of the elite.
Works Cited
Branch, W.J., Farris, P.W., & Haskins, M.E. (2011). Pay for performance: keep it simple and value-focused. Compensation and Benefits review, 43(2): 82-91.
Gatti
, U. (1980). Clinical criminologist in a changing world. Montreal: University of Montreal
Peeler, J. (2001). Elites, structures and political action in Latin America. International Review of Sociology,11(2): 231-246.
Proctor, I. (1980). Voluntarism and structural-functionalism in Parsons’ early work. Human Studies, 3, 331-346.