The Tet Offensive: An Analysis of U.S. Intelligence Failures


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Essay #: 053014
Total text length is 79,442 characters (approximately 54.8 pages).

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The beginning:
The Tet Offensive: An Analysis of U.S. Intelligence Failures
The Tet Offensive launched by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong in January of 1968 was a decisive turning point in the Vietnam War, for it shattered the perception that the United States was winning and significantly reduced public support for the war. From a military intelligence perspective, Tet demonstrated that strategic surprise in warfare can never be eliminated, and that intelligence failures are inevitable, but the most important lesson of Tet is that military intelligence failures are not generally caused by inadequate intelligence collection, they are most often caused by failures to effectively assess and understand the enemy’s intent and capabilities.
The end:
.....nam, Ho Chi Ming [sic] to Hell and back if that's what it takes to win....
should be tried for treason.37
In light of such contradictory evidence, it would be ludicrous to argue that there was a Muncie consensus on the Tet offensive. Based on the best evidence possible, it seems apparent that confusion, ambiguity and contradiction marked Muncie's response to this most crucial event of the war. While some cried doom, gloom, and stalemate, others saw a window of opportunity to apply maximum force for maximum results. The conventional wisdom that there was a national
, a sense of pessimism over the obvious psychological victory of the enemy during Tet may well be true. But this modest local study does not prove the case.