The Swarming Enemy The U.S. Army defines enemy as “the individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners” (FM 7-100, 2003, p. ix). This definition is supposed to be a starting place from which to understand the enemy. However, there are two problematic assumptions within this definition that complicate any such understanding before it can even be framed. This essay will explain the nature of these two assumptions, and analyze why they must be re-assessed in order to provide a more helpful platform from assessing enemies, their motivations, their goals, etc. It may seem like an...The end:
..... insight into why there is, in the traditional sense, no enemy to fight (discounting the cadre of die-hard Taliban, whose numbers may number only in the thousands, many insurgents have swarmed to join the anti-U.S. effort in order to avenge tribal honor). Just as cops who work beats for years have the best understanding of local criminals and gangs warm together to conduct certain crimes, it takes a long-term garrison, augmented with plenty of police and human intelligence units, to understand and respond to the true nature of the swarming enemy. However, since this form of action is inimical to Army doctrine, it is unrealistic to expect the Army to understand what today’s enemy is; to someone with a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.