The Moral Treatment of Non-Human Species In “All Animals Are Equal” Peter Singer argues that there can be no rational, moral justification for excluding animals from the same moral consideration we offer members of our own species. Leaning heavily on the principle of utility, he points out that to do otherwise would be a kind of specieism akin to racism or sexism. Because of the implications of this argument, Singer has endured his share of criticism. For example, Bonnie Steinbock has pointed out — among other objections — that Singer’s utilitarian position does not allow for, what she argues, is the justifiable privileged moral worth of human beings. My own position mirrors Singer’s, if only because of the overt hubris and potential for...The end:
.....cates core cultural assumptions, it is merely part of the continuing effort to undermine human arrogance by demonstrating that human beings do not occupy a special place in the universe (Copernicus and Galileo), on the Earth (Darwin), or even amongst the whole of life on the planet. Singer’s strong attack on specieism argues that the world, and the life within it, are not human possessions to be treated as we desire without consideration, especially when it applies to sentient non-human life. Works Cited Singer, Peter. “All Animals Are Equal.” In Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Tom Regan & Peter Singer, eds.). New Jersey, 1989: 148-162. Steinbock, Bonnie. “Specieism and the Idea of Equality.” Philosophy 53.204 (Apr. 1978): 247-256.