Hume's Views on Causal Judgment This paper will analyze and discuss Hume’s views on causal judgments. Very briefly and excessively simplified, Hume’s causal judgment can be briefly summarized as follows: we can predict an occurrence of event A after an event B if we know from before that every time B occurs, event A follows. However, as the analysis will reveal, Hume is skeptical about this process: our causation is based on the assumption that every time we perceive an occurrence of B, we shall also perceive an occurrence of A, an assumption based on experience. This does not mean that we actually observe the real (actual) causality between A and B. Hume bases his arguments for causality (or the lack of observable causality) on two...The end:
.....hich “experience may produce a belief and a judgment of causes and effects… without being once thought of” (Hume, 97). It is this custom that forces the imagination to make “a transition from the idea of one object to that of its usual attendant and from the impression of one to a more lively idea of the other” (Hume, 170). It is important here to note that custom acts on the ideas from imagination, those ideas that can be freely transformed and changed, and turns them into beliefs. As a consequence, our expectation that A will follow B can have its source in imagination, not in perception. Works Cited: Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Eds. L.A. Selby- Bigge and P.H. Nidditch . 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Print.