Free Will in the Compatibilist Theory This philosophical study will analyze the valid associations of free will in the compatibilist theory, which can be effectively integrated with determinism. By observing the writings of Henry Frankfurt, the compatibilist theory that free will can co-exist in a determinist causal system is one facet of “alternative possibilities” that can exist in time. By arguing for Frankfurt’s use of “freedom of action” through second-order volitions in regards to the will, one can define the importance of desires that determine a free will outside of these personal choices within regulated time frames. By arguing against the determinist view that actions emulate from a single point in time, the “freedom” of the...The end:
..... present tense “freedom of action” can alter the future and break the strict determinism that limits unobstructed freedom. This, in turn, dictates the momentary presence of “liberty” in the choice being made, which supports the freedom of will to override the hardliner determinism that forbids a differing view on the nature of time on human choice and the primacy of causal factors. Works Cited: Double, Richard. The Non-Reality of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. Frankfurt, Henry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” in Fischer, John Martin. “Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism.” In Inwagen, Peter Von. “An Argument for Incompatibilism” in (Customer fill in the rest of bibliography, I only received files of the test.).