Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s Analysis of NASA Accidents

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Essay #: 061357
Total text length is 8,811 characters (approximately 6.1 pages).

Excerpts from the Paper

The beginning:
Columbia Accident Investigation Board's Analysis of NASA Accidents
In CAIB’s analysis of NASA as regards the Challenger and Columbia accidents, they state “the recommendations for change are not only for fixing the Shuttleʼs technical system, but also for fixing each part of the organizational system that produced Columbiaʼs failure” (“Columbia Accident Investigation Board,” 2003, p. 195). In their view, both space shuttle tragedies were due to massive failures of NASA organizational culture to validate and communicate vital information in decision making processes that that could have averted both space shuttle voyage calamities (“Columbia Accident Investigation Board,” 2003). In CAIB’s view, “NASA culture encouraged flying with flaws...
The end:
..... factor here is independence, because this is necessary to create the objectivity that a safety culture mandates.
References
Columbia Accident Investigation Board. (2003). Retrieved from http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL1/PART02.PDF
Gugliotta, G. (2005). NASA chief speeds plan for spacecraft. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/08/AR2005050800834.html
NASA – President Bush offers new vision for NASA. (2004). Official NASA Website. As retrieved from http://www.nasa.gov/missions/solarsystem/bush_vision.html
Tushman, M. & O’Reilly, C. (1997). Working through innovation: A practical guide to leading organizational change and renewal. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.