Aristotle’s Answer to the Problem of Akrasia One of the great moral dilemmas discussed by the ancient Greek philosophers was incontinent action, or what Socrates termed “ akrasia ” (the Greek term). “ Akrasia ” is essentially acting against one’s better judgment, or in other words, knowing that doing one thing is right but then deciding to do something else, even the opposite. For reasons that will become clear this presented a difficult problem for a theory of ethics and knowledge, and Socrates responded by rejecting it as an impossibility. This essay explores the dilemma presented by akrasia and Aristotle’s response to it, demonstrating Aristotle’s view, contra Socrates, that genuine akrasia is in fact possible and is a product of a...The end:
..... the other hand, recognizes that there are cases of genuine akrasia where people can be assigned responsibility for their actions, which can be explained in relation to virtue. Works Cited Curzer , Howard J. “Aristotle’s Painful Path to Virtue.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 (2002): 141-162. Henry, Devin. “Aristotle on Pleasure and the Worst Form of Akrasia .” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (2002): 255-270. Price, A.W. “ Acrasia and Self-Control.” The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Ed. R. Kraut. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006. 234-254. Rorty , Amelie O. “ Akrasia and Pleasure: Nicomachean Ethics Book 7.” Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics. Ed. A. O. Rorty . Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 267-284.