Aristotle’s Answer to the Problem of Akrasia

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Essay #: 072607
Total text length is 9,004 characters (approximately 6.2 pages).

Excerpts from the Paper

The beginning:
Aristotle’s Answer to the Problem of Akrasia
One of the great moral dilemmas discussed by the ancient Greek philosophers was incontinent action, or what Socrates termed “
akrasia
” (the Greek term). “
Akrasia
” is essentially acting against one’s better judgment, or in other words, knowing that doing one thing is right but then deciding to do something else, even the opposite. For reasons that will become clear this presented a difficult problem for a theory of ethics and knowledge, and Socrates responded by rejecting it as an impossibility. This essay explores the dilemma presented by
akrasia
and Aristotle’s response to it, demonstrating Aristotle’s view, contra Socrates, that genuine
akrasia
is in fact possible and is a product of a...
The end:
..... the other hand, recognizes that there are cases of genuine
akrasia
where people can be assigned responsibility for their actions, which can be explained in relation to virtue.
Works Cited
Curzer
, Howard J. “Aristotle’s Painful Path to Virtue.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 (2002): 141-162.
Henry, Devin. “Aristotle on Pleasure and the Worst Form of
Akrasia
.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (2002): 255-270.
Price, A.W. “
Acrasia
and Self-Control.” The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s
Nicomachean
Ethics. Ed. R. Kraut. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006. 234-254.
Rorty
,
Amelie
O. “
Akrasia
and Pleasure:
Nicomachean
Ethics Book 7.” Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics. Ed. A. O.
Rorty
. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 267-284.