African Philosophy Exam 3. Wiredu and Gyekye present very different conceptions of personhood with reference to the thinking of the Akan people. This being said, this essay will argue that both approaches present fascinating and illuminating explications of personhood that, it will be seen, contrast significantly with more restrictive models in Western systems of thought. In particular, the incorporation of an ethical dimension within this system that is analogous to complex modern psychological models suggests that we not dismiss the value of such traditional systems of thought – even when not clearly philosophical or critical – when examining cultural modes of thinking. Wiredu contends that within the Akan system of thought a person is...The end:
..... parts to characterize a larger whole, is all too prevalent in application to non-European and non-European contexts in everyday life in Canada. The readings in “African Systems of Thought” not only directly engage such practices but also, with specific illustration to the diversity of African systems of thought, undermine its particular application with respect to Africa and Africans. Bibliography Appiah, Kwame Anthony. In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Gyekye, Kwame. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995. Wiredu, Kwasi. Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.