Accounting Theory for Executive Compensation

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Essay #: 054803
Total text length is 6,681 characters (approximately 4.6 pages).

Excerpts from the Paper

The beginning:
Accounting Theory for Executive Compensation
Accounting information is an important measurement for executive compensation, especially in the wake of widespread challenges associated with the current global economic crisis. The interjection of accountants in the process of both determining the right type of compensation packages for executives and in applying analytical tools in the allocation of funds is becoming all the more necessary. This is because of the fact that, as Bebchuk and Fried note, “flawed compensation arrangements have been widespread, persistent, and systemic, and they have stemmed from defects in the underlying governance structure” (ix). This paper will serve to explore the broad intersection of accounting theory and...
The end:
.....y national and international regulations, but also to ensure that executive compensation packages will allow the firm to remain sustainable over the long term.
References
Bebchuk, L.A. and Fried, J.M. Pay without Performance: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. UC Berkeley: Boalt Hall, 2004.
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Carter, M.E., Lynch, L.J. and Tuna, A. “The Role of Accounting
in the Design of CEO Equity Compensation.” Accounting Review 82.2 (2007): 327-383.
Jensen, M. and Murphy, K. "Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives." Journal of Political Economy 98.2 (1990): 225-258.