FREE ESSAY ON THE ARCHITECTONIC FORM OF KANT'S COPERNICAN SYSTEM

THE ARCHITECTONIC FORM OF KANT'S COPERNICAN SYSTEM

The Architectonic Form of Kant's Copernican System
Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it regards all our 
knowledge as belonging to a possible system. [Kt1:502]
1. The Copernican Turn
The previous chapter provided not only concrete evidence that Kant's 
System is based on the principle of perspective [II.2-3], but also a general 
outline of its perspectival structure [II.4]. The task this sets for the 
interpreter is to establish in greater detail the extent to which the System 
actually does unfold according to this pattern. This will be undertaken 
primarily in Parts Two and Three. But before concluding Part One, it will 
be helpful to examine in more detail the logical structure of the relationships 
between the various parts of Kant's System, and how they fit together to 
compose what we have called Kant's 'Copernican Perspective'.
Kant rather boldly compares the contribution made to philosophy by 
Kt1 with that which Copernicus made to astronomy. Copernicus explained 
'the movements of heavenly bodies' (i.e., of the planets, stars and sun) by 
denying 'that they all revolved round the spectator' (i.e., the earth), as they 
indeed appear to do, and suggesting instead that the earth and other planets 
revolve around the sun while the stars remain at rest. Likewise, Kant 
attempts to explain our knowledge of objects in general by denying 'that all 
our knowledge must conform to objects', as it indeed appears to do, and 
suggesting instead 'that objects must conform to our knowledge' [Kt1:xvi; 
cf. Kt65:83]. This metaphor, expressing the difference between appearance 
and reality in the theories of both Copernicus and Kant, suggests the 
following two models:
?
(a) Appearance (b) Reality
Figure III.1: The Two Aspects of a Copernican Revolution
These diagrams can be used to represent Kant's Copernican revolution 
simply by replacing 'earth' with 'subject' and 'sun' with 'object', and by 
stipulating that motion represents the active, determining factor in 
knowledge, while rest represents the passive factor. As a result, (a) would 
depict the ordinary person's (as such, quite legitimate) Empirical 
Perspective on the world, while (b) would depict the philosopher's special 
Transcendental Perspective.
The 'change in perspective' [Kt1:xxii] required by the philosopher's 
switch from (a) to (b) is the revolutionary 'touchstone' of Kant's entire 
System [see II.1], for it reveals that 'we can know a priori of things only 
what we ourselves put into them' [xviii]. The philosopher's primary 
attention, therefore, is directed away from the objects of knowledge and is 
focused instead on the subject (i.e., on humanity) and our mental activities. 
On this point, at least, there is widespread agreement among interpreters. 
Kant's Copernican revolution has been said to consist, for example, in 
claims such as these:
human knowledge can only be understood if we hypothesize the activities of 
the knower [C3:237];
the epistemological conditions for knowing natural entities are at the 
same time the ontological conditions for their existence as such [i.e., 
empirically] [Y2:977];
the universality and necessity of synthetic a priori propositions as 
established by ... critical argumentation are ... specifically relativized to the 
workings of the human intellect [R4:318; cf. 321];
the objects of human knowledge can only be legitimately [described] ... 
if they are 'considered' in relation to the human mind and its conceptual 
scheme.1
Unfortunately, the agreement among Kant-scholars on general matters 
such as this does not carry over into matters of detailed interpretation or 
critical evaluation. Indeed, inasmuch as Kant never provides a thorough and 
consistent explanation of the logical relationships between the many 
constitutive 'elements' in his three Critiques--such as those in Kt1 
concerning knowledge, which he discusses in the Transcendental Doctrine 
of Elements,2 there will probably never be widespread agreement 
concerning their intended meanings and relative importance. But in spite of 
the negative answer which the consensus of two centuries of interpretive 
scholarship has given to the question of the unity of Kant's System [cf. 
I.1], it seems incongruous to regard Kant as a 'megaphilosopher' and yet to 
confess that he failed in so basic a task. I shall therefore attempt in this 
chapter to reveal the architectonic unity of his entire System by providing an 
outline of its formal structure. My underlying goal will be to set the stage 
for an analysis of the content, and thus of the detailed arguments, of the 
three Critical systems [see Part Three]--one which could serve not only to 
facilitate more widespread agreement among interpreters, but also to help us 
understand why Kant believed his 'critical philosophy opens up the 
prospect of permanent peace among philosophers' [Kt33:416(288); see 
XII.3-4].