FREE ESSAY ON DIALLO INCIDENT; ONE OFFICERS PERSPECTIVE

DIALLO INCIDENT; ONE OFFICERS PERSPECTIVE

Craig H. Brockman
Instructor: Eric Becker
College Writing 221624
23 April 2000 
The Diallo Incident; One Officers Perspective
In the quiet post-midnight hours of February 4, 1999, 41 shots rang out in the entry
vestibule of a South Bronx apartment house. Within seconds, a young man laid dead, four
policemen standing over his lifeless body. A 22-year-old immigrant from West Africa was
the unfortunate victim. The police officers: four white men from the New York City Police
Department's Street Crimes Unit (SCU). And almost before daylight could illumine the
city's vast tract of high-rise businesses and low-rise brownstones, there came the first
calls of Police Brutality, Racism, even Murder. 
But were these four officers, who together fired 41 shots at an unarmed young man,
indeed, guilty as charged? Or was this shooting, as the officers would attempt to
explain, a tragedy of the greatest possible human dimensions? Did the media ask the right
questions and act in a responsible manner? Did the local politicians act in a responsible
manner? And were they inappropriate actions or were they appropriate for the situation?
Has society changed that much?
Do we, society, take the word of the media's insight, and follow people who thrive on
media attention? Who are the real prosecutors? Who makes the decision to condemn the
actions of four police officers? Do we prosecute the officers of a police department who
were trained to do what they did? 
Has anyone of these so-called experts ever looked into the past situations of men and
women in the police department? And then ask the question: Why did they (the police)
shoot that unarmed man? Has the police department trained the police officers the proper
way? Or will the police departments around the country now train police officers to
become less aggressive, giving way for an officer to worry about jail time and the loss
of his financial status? 
Will this lead the police to turn a blind-eye in order to not get involved, and avoid
their names being the target of political and community leaders? These are questions to
be asked and answered. But the real questions should be asked to the people that care
about their communities. These questions should not be asked to the followers of these
self proclaimed community leaders who possibly couldn't care less about the quality of
life that surrounds their community, some of who live in another state, and may not
concern themselves with the pursuit of happiness of the people that live in that
community, but the media attention they can receive. 
This is one officers perspective, a perspective that some may not agree with, but it is
honest, it is true, and it is heart wrenching.
This is no hype, no media propaganda. This is the view of an incident that happened on a
Bronx street on a winter's night in 1999. 
Hopefully this will be a thought-provoking view, for not only the reader, but also the
author. Just ask yourself these questions that I have posted, and I hope that you will
understand my perspective.
In the early morning hours of February 4, 1999 a tragedy occurred which would eventually
separate the people of City of New York and its police department.
On this morning, four members of the New York City Police Departments Street Crime Unit
{SCU} were on patrol in the Bronx within the confines of the 43rd Precinct: a precinct in
a neighborhood that is considered a high crime area. The four officers on patrol were:
Police Officer Sean Carroll, 36, Police Officer Kenneth Boss, 28, Police Officer Edward
McMellon, 27, and Police Officer Richard Murphy, 27.
These four officers would, on this morning, come in contact with Mr. Amadou Diallo, 22,
an African immigrant who now lived in the Bronx.
On this morning, slightly after twelve midnight, the four officers were assigned to
plainclothes and had an unmarked radio motor patrol car (RMP) as their patrol vehicle;
this is standard operation for the SCU. Their job is to keep an eye on the street for
criminal behavior and prevent crimes when possible.
The officers drove down the block of Wheeler Avenue at about this time of the morning.
P.O. Carroll, who was sitting in the front passenger seat, looked to his right and saw
what appeared to be a man peering through the vestibule area of 1157 Wheeler Ave. P.O.
Carroll knew from past crime patterns that when push-in robberies are committed, a
lookout is usually placed on the outside of the building, while one or two men ring a
doorbell. When the tenant opens the door, the perpetrators push in and rob, rape, and
sometimes they will kill the tenant. These types of crime patterns have always had some
type of force used. The force sometimes will be physical, and in a lot of situations guns
are used. The lookout will alert the "perps" when a police officer or other persons
approach. 
At this time, P.O. Carroll told P.O. Boss, the driver of the rmp, to stop the rmp. P.O.
Carroll exited the rmp, and as he approached the building, with his police shield
displayed on his chest hanging from around his neck. P.O. Carroll instructed Mr. Diallo
to stop. Mr. Diallo turned away from P.O. Carroll placing his back towards the officer.
After being told another time from P.O. Carroll to turn around, Mr. Diallo stood facing
the far left hand corner of the vestibule. This is when P.O. Carroll instructed Mr.
Diallo to stop again and show his hands; Mr. Diallo at first did not comply verbally or
physically. Suddenly, Mr. Diallo quickly turned in a counterclockwise motion with his
right hand extended just above his waist, and in his hand was a black object, an object
in which P.O. Carroll believed to be a gun. 
The positioning of the other officers was also detrimental to this tragedy. P.O. Boss was
just about left of and behind P.O. Carroll at the time P.O. Carroll ascended the couple
of steps into the vestibule. P.O. McMellon and P.O. Murphy were approaching the building
at the same time as P.O.'s Carroll and Boss entered the vestibule. P.O. Boss also
believed he saw a gun, when at this time P.O. Carroll seeing the black object yelled
"Gun", a common practice used by officers to inform other officers of a threat in the
least amount of time. In fear for his life, and the life of his partners, P.O. Carroll
fired his weapon at Mr. Diallo. P.O. Boss was also firing, when he attempted to back out
of the vestibule and tried to get to cover. P.O. Boss described the scene during his
testimony during direct examination: I saw Mr. Diallo -- he was in the back of the
vestibule -- he was crouched, he was down low -- and he had his hand out -- and I seen a
gun -- in his hand". P.O. McMellon had run up to the vestibule and fired four shots. P.O.
McMellon also saw Mr. Diallo crouching with an outstretched hand, after firing his shots,
P.O. McMellon fell backwards down the few steps that led to the vestibule, he landed on
his buttocks, breaking his tailbone. P.O.'s Boss and Murphy thought that McMellon was
shot. All at the same time P.O. Murphy had fired five shots at Mr. Diallo in order,
because at this time P.O. Murphy still felt that Mr. Diallo was a threat and also saw
what appeared to be a gun in Mr. Diallo's right hand, it subsequently turned out to be a
black wallet in Mr. Diallo's palm.
This entire episode lasted approximately five seconds, and a total of 41 shots were
fired, with 19 of those shots hitting Mr. Diallo.
Within hours of this tragedy there was public outrage led by the infamous Reverend Al
Sharpton. Without any hesitance, Rev. Sharpton was reaching out to the media and calling
the four officers murderers. Without due process being admitted to the officers, the
reverend had these officers tried, convicted, and hung.
Mayor Giuliani quickly came to the defense of the officers as he usually does. He asked
the media and the public to give the officers the benefit of the doubt until the
investigation was completed. 
What followed was a protest in front of One Police Plaza (N.Y.P.D. Headquarters) by
influential people in the political and celebrity world.
Much has been said about the four officers training. Also questioned was their technique
used on the street for stopping and questioning people they reasonably suspect, have, are
currently committing, or are about to commit a crime.
These are four police officers that went on patrol one night, and followed department
guidelines, tactics, and the laws of New York State, but they made a mistake, a very big
mistake. They acted on their instincts, they thought that they were going to die, and
they acted in the manner that they thought was appropriate. They fired their weapons
until they felt the threat was eliminated, as they, and the rest of the police officers
in the N.Y.P.D. are trained to do.
The big question on everyone's mind was "why 41 shots?" Another question was "how come
they just didn't shoot that thing out of his hand?" (That's always one of my favorites).
The question that should be asked in all this is, "If I were in the position of the
officers involved with the Diallo shooting, and given the training and past experience,
would I have reacted in the same manner?" Your answer would probably be "I don't know".
There are police officers with twenty or thirty years on the job that will answer that
question with "I don't know".
Let me share a very terrible incident to you. This is an incident that may have the
reader of this essay consider the reasons why a police officer does what he or she was
trained to do. 
On February 28, 1997 in North Hollywood California, there was an incredible shootout that
the L.A.P.D. had with two very well armed and very well bodily-protected bank robbers.
During this shootout the officers were unable to put these robbers down. The two bank
robbers were so well protected by body armor, that they actually stood in the middle of
the street firing at the officers while reloading from the trunk of their "getaway car".
The officers shot, as we are trained to do, at center mass of the body. But to no avail
these cretin's were not going to be put down easy, the bullets were bouncing off the
robber's own bullet resistant vests. One was eventually stopped by a shot to the head;
the other eventually succumbed to his wounds also.
The L.A.P.D. and other departments learned a valuable lesson that day on tactics.
Almost immediately the N.Y.P.D. changed its' training at the shooting range. We have
always been taught to shoot for center mass. The torso is the largest target for an
officer to aim at without actually using the sight of the officers' weapon. After being
in a shootout myself in 1993, I can surely attest that there is no time to use sights.
This is why we have a sniper unit (Emergency Service Unit), they at least have the luxury
of setting up, taking aim, and getting the O.K. to shoot a dangerous felon. 
When officers arrived at Rodmans Neck in the Bronx, where the N.Y.P.D. shooting range is
located, officers are placed in a situation where they were being told to shoot for the
head of the suspect and continue firing, then run at the subject, even sometimes from the
kneeling position with our hands behind our heads, as if we were in a hostage situation.
We were to fire and reload as quickly as possible and get back into the fight and
survive. This was the new curriculum for the N.Y.P.D. that was the result of the L.A.P.D.
shootout. The instructors' job at the shooting range was to shake the officer up as much
as possible while the officer reloaded and fired. Instructors would stand behind the
officers, not just yelling, but firing M-14 semi-automatic rifles near the ears of the
officer to simulate a gun battle, but to also get the adrenaline of the officer going as
quickly as possible. It works! 
As a highway patrolman who works alone, these exercises were conducted with a 3:1 ratio.
Running along side the highway officer were three instructors' yelling and screaming.
After being short on breath, you are to fire a shotgun four times, and then fire your
handgun immediately following the expenditure of your shotgun rounds 16 times, and
reload. This is in addition to the training area we call the "Fun House". The "Fun House"
is not any fun at all. It is a place where the officer recruit has a simulated death
while attending the academy. The inside of this building looks like a rat-infested
tenement. The recruits mission is to die. The recruit cannot win; it is merely a training
plan to show the officers' weaknesses, and strengths of the officers' adversaries. 
As you walk down a narrow hallway on a simulated radio run of a man with a gun, the
lights flicker, doors pop open, actors run from apartment to apartment. All this time the
officers' peers are looking at him or her, they are perched on top of the walls, they
stand on three-foot high catwalk. As the officer enters the apartment, the officer
observes a man and a woman standing in the middle of a living room. The couple is arguing
with each other. The man fits the description of the person with the gun. This is where
the instructors grade the officer. What will the officer recruit do? Common sense would
have the officer tactically approach the man with the gun, and frisk him to eliminate a
possible threat. But since the officer is a recruit at this time, and recruits don't want
to be yelled at by the instructor, the recruit decides to quell the situation by just
talking with the couple. When, bank--bang...the officer recruit and his/her partner have
just been shot and killed by that male subject. The yelling now begins by the instructor
on why the officer recruit did not eliminate a threat and do a quick legal exterior frisk
of the male. "Would that have been aggressive?" the instructor would ask. The answer
would be no. The law has been spelled out for situations like this that permits a frisk
on the subject, given this was a radio run and the communications operator is considered
a reliable informant, giving the officers the description of the perpetrator. True the
operator gets the description from an outside source, but the officers get the
information from the 911 operators, which make the operators our informants.
The officers' involved in the Diallo incident are experienced police officers. These are
officers who have been placed in life and death situations day in and day out. In a
police department of 40,000 police officers there is a hero everyday. Babies are being
delivered, CPR is being administered, and a lonely old lady just called 911 with a false
call, just to have an officer respond so she has a person to talk to. However this is not
what the public is told. These types of events just don't sell newspapers.
Are there rotten apples in the N.Y.P.D.? Absolutely, as there are in every profession.
For the most part, police officers themselves would like to have those rotten apples
thrown off the department. Because of the officers that abuse their power, it makes it
that much harder for the majority of the officers, the honest hardworking police officers
to do their jobs. These four police officers are part of the majority.
The closing statement during the trial of these four officers, Chief Prosecuting
Assistant District Attorney Eric Warner stated: " [The defendants didn't come] on duty
that night with the intent to kill Amadou Diallo or anybody else. But when they got out
of that car in front of Amadou Diallo's home in the early morning of February 4th, they
made the conscious decision to shoot him"
That is a statement that is true and false. Did these officers intend to shoot him when
they got out of their car? The evidence proved that as a falsehood. Did they intend to
shoot Mr. Diallo when they felt their lives were in danger? You better believe they did.
As for this terrible unfortunate incident on February 4, 1999, this wasn't a crime, nor
was it a racist action; this was a tragedy. This was a tragedy for five men, five
children of God.